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APPLICATION OF THE AUDIT PRIVILEGE TO





For a number of years, there has been uncertainty over whether
(or under what conditions) an evidentiary privilege, sometimes referred
to as the "audit privilege," will apply to protect corporate self-audits of
compliance with environmental laws and regulations. The doubt has
persisted because a clearly defined and consistently applied
environmental audit privilege doctrine has not emerged in the federal
case law. To encourage corporations to conduct audits, a number of state
legislatures have enacted statutes granting some form of audit privilege
or immunity from use of audits against the corporation if certain
conditions are met. Congress has also considered draft legislation which
would provide similar incentives to conduct audits. These measures
have been vigorously opposed by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") which has threatened to strip those states of their EPA
enforcement powers and whose officials have testified on many
occasions against the proposed federal legislation. At the same time,
however, the EPA has issued a series of audit policies to encourage
corporations to conduct audits. The result has been added uncertainty as
to whether corporations should or should not conduct formal internal
reviews of the status of their environmental law compliance.
Within the last few years, another area of federal regulatory
activity -- occupational safety and health ("OSH") -- has entered the audit
privilege debate. Various forms of audit privileges and other incentives
for corporations to conduct internal compliance reviews have appeared
in certain of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA") reform and reinvention initiatives. At this time, it is not clear
what form audit privileges or immunities will take in the occupational
safety and health area.
* Margaret S. Lopez is an associate with the law firm of Heenan, Althen & Roles,
Washington, D.C., where she practices in the areas of occupational safety and health, employment
law, and labor law. B.A. University of Virginia, 1984; M.A. Georgetown University, 1989; J.D. The
George Washington University School of Law, 1996.
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This article will describe the current application of the audit
privilege to environmental audits and OSH audits. The article will then
make recommendations for the future of OSH audits based upon the
lessons learned from the experience to date with the various initiatives
in place or being considered to encourage voluntary environmental
compliance auditing.
1. WHAT ARE ENVIRONMENTAL OR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH AuDITs?
Environmental or OSH audits, as the terms are used in this
article, are internal reviews voluntarily conducted by companies to
measure their compliance with laws and regulations.' The audits are
often conducted by teams consisting of one or more technical experts,
often outside consultants hired by the company for their independence
as well as their expertise, company personnel, and sometimes in-house
or outside counsel. The audit teams often use a variety of information-
gathering and investigatory tools, including questionnaires, interviews,
testing, and first-hand observation. Team members create a number of
documents in the course of conducting the audit. The documents may
include notes, diagrams, photographs, and ultimately an audit report that
contains several sections. Certain sections contain predominately the
findings of the auditors while other sections may contain analysis,
opinions and recommendations. There may also be other documents
created that are, in a sense, a product of the audit. These include notes,
memoranda, or reports concerning activities taken to address any
deficiencies noted in the audit report.
II. WHY SHOULD AUDITS BE PROTECTED AND ENCOURAGED?
The audit privilege2 has been recognized in certain federal and
' See generally, Michael Ray Harris, Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An
Examination of the Debate over Legal Protection for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 663,
666,705 (1996).
2 There are various names for the privilege, including the following: self-critical
subjective analysis privilege, In re Burlington N., 679 F.2d 762, 765 (8th Cir. 1982); peer review
privilege, Pagano v. OrovilleHosp., 145 F.R.D. 683,690 (E.D. Cal. 1993); self-evaluation privilege,
Hoffman v. United Telecomn., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 440,442 (D. Kan. 1987); privilege for confidential
self-evaluative analysis, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 705-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); self-
examination privilege, Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
"privilege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents," Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609
F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 1979); qualified privilege for self-evaluative documents, Reynolds Metals
Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); privilege of
self-critical analysis, Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978); self-
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state courts and enacted in certain state statutes to encourage
corporations to conduct self-evaluations in areas in which there is a
strong public interest that honest evaluations be performed, effective
recommendations for improvement in performance or compliance be
made to management, and, in some instances, good faith reporting of
regulatory violations be made to the appropriate government agency.
The need for the privilege is based on the concern that if the products of
audits were discoverable in court actions or used in investigations against
the company, there would be such a disincentive to perform the audits
that it would outweigh any benefit to the corporation in conducting the
audits. The risk of adverse use against the corporation of any revelations
the audits may contain would simply overwhelm any interest in
conducting the audits.3
Courts have noted, however, that unlike certain other evidentiary
privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, the audit privilege exists
to support a public interest, not any private interest of the one conducting
the audit.4 Therefore, in any litigation concerning whether there should
be such a privilege for the materials in question, the justification for the
privilege must be based on a public interest in having honest and
thorough audits of this nature conducted and documented, rather than on
any interest solely held by the corporation seeking to assert the privilege.
In theory, an audit privilege may be invoked to protect discovery
of audit materials in a variety of types of court actions including civil
actions between private parties or between a private party and a
government entity;5 government agency civil enforcement actions against
private entities;6 and criminal actions.7 Within these different types of
critical privilege, United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9 (D. Conn. 1990). For simplicity's
sake, this article will use the short term "audit privilege."
A 1995 survey by Price Waterhouse contains data confirming this. Although 75
percent of those responding to the survey indicated that they conducted environmental audits, the
survey showed that "'there is still a perceived reluctance to expand audit programs, in the face of
possible enforcement."' Hearings on H.R. 1047 before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 104th Cong.,
Ist Sess., Serial No. 88, June 29, 1995 at 267-68 (1995) (reprint of Price Waterhouse News Release,
April 6, 1995).
' See Warren v. Legg Mason Woou Walker, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D.N.C.
1995), "It must be remembered that the self-critical analysis privilege exists out of concern for the
public and is not personal to the one asserting the privilege," (citing Todd v. South Jersey Hosp. Sys.,
152 F.R.D. 676 (D.N.J. 1993).
See, e.g., Wiener v. NEC Electronics, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 124, 129 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(documents provided to government for use in antidumping investigation sought in patent
infringement action); Tones v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (D.N.J. 1996) (plaintiffs seek
police department internal investigation reports in action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
See, e.g., Reich v. Hercules, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 367, 368-69 (D.N.J. 1994).
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 386 (D. Md. 1994).
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actions the audit materials may be sought from the defendant company
that caused the audit to be performed or from the government entity that
received the audit materials from the company or from an independent
entity that was hired to conduct the audit. Thus, there are a myriad of
possible scenarios in which an audit privilege may be invoked.
Added to this complexity is the wide variety of items that may
be considered to be "audit materials." The materials to be protected by
the privilege could conceivably include anything that was created in the
audit process. Examples could be notes of the audit team members,
photographs, drawings, diagrams, drafts of the audit report, the final
audit report itself, and possibly a follow-up report or memorandum
discussing efforts to correct any deficiencies documented in the audit
report. It is important to note at the outset, however, that while all these
items, and more, could be considered to be "audit materials" what might
actually be protected by the audit privilege as interpreted by a court or
provided by a statute could be substantially less than all these items.
III. THE COMMON LAW AUDIT PRIVILEGE
A. General Principles
Courts have neither consistently defined nor predictably applied
the audit privilege! There is even disagreement among the courts as to
whether such a privilege should be recognized at all. This is due to the
stated reluctance of the courts to create new privileges or to expand
existing privileges. It may also be due to the wide variety of
circumstances in which the audit privilege is sought to be applied.
In the federal courts, privileges against discovery of certain
materials and communications are recognized pursuant to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
there shall not be discovery of privileged communications, documents,
and other materials.9 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states
that, subject to certain exceptions such as Congress' enacting a statute
recognizing a privilege, evidentiary privileges shall be created and
Many courts have noted that the audit privilege has "remained largely unde-
fined." Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145,147 (E.D. Va. 1993). Accord Reichhold Chemicals,
Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994) ("[Tlhe self-critical analysis privilege
has been developed on an ad hoc basis, and the scope of the privilege has varied greatly.").
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."). See also United
States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 8-9 (D. Conn. 1990).
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interpreted in the common law." Therefore, evidentiary privileges have
not been created expressly in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rather,
those rules provide that privileges will be created and interpreted by
Congress and the courts.
Although they are given the power to do so in Rule 501, the
federal courts are reluctant to create new privileges or to apply existing
privileges in broad ways." In spite of this general reluctance, the federal
courts have created certain privileges against discovery where the
balance of interests favored recognition of a privilege. Among the
privileges that federal courts have *created are the attorney-client
privilege; 2 the physician-patient privilege; 3 the informant's privilege; 4
the spousal privilege; 5 and the governmental deliberative process
privilege. 16
The first case to recognize an audit privilege was decided in
1970.'7 In Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., the court announced that
a privilege would apply to protect a hospital peer review report from
discovery.' 8 Since that case, federal courts have applied an audit
privilege to a number of specific types of audit materials including those
at issue in such diverse cases as those arising under securities law'9 and
'0 FED. R. EvID. 501 provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
" See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (noting that "[wle
do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it 'promotes sufficiently important interests
to outweigh the need for probative evidence." (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,710 (1974) (stating that privileges are "not lightly
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth"); United States
v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 915 F. Supp. 308, 311 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (stating that
the first consideration in deciding whether to create a new privilege under Fed. R. Evid. 501 is
whether Congress has already considered the issue and declined to create a statutory privilege).
"S Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
'3 Hardy v. Riser, 309 F. Supp. 1234,1238 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
14 Pilar v. Steamship Hess Petrol, 55 F.R.D. 159, 162-163 (D. Md. 1972).
' Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
" Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 97 F.R.D. 749, 751 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
'7 Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 50F.R.D. at 250-51.
'9 See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sees. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197,205 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); New
York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
216 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. [VOL. 12:211
employment law.2° Courts have also recognized audit privileges in
academic and medical peer review contexts,2 in cases concerning
product safety assessments,22 and in railroad accident cases.23
More often, however, courts deny a motion that audit material
be protected by an audit privilege. In a number of cases, courts have
questioned or declined to find that such a privilege even exists.24 In
other cases, courts deny the privilege based on the type of audit involved
or other particular circumstances of the case.'
Even when courts do state that a privilege may or does exist,
courts often will so narrowly construe the privilege that it will not be
' See, e.g., O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211,218 (D. Mass. 1980) (protecting
from discovery in an action under Title VII sections of a personnel policy containing self-evaluation);
Jamison v. Storer Broad. Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286, 1296 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (protecting affirmative
action plan from discovery), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.
1987); Sheppard v. Consolidated Edison Co., 893 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that
affirmative action plan is privileged).
21 See, e.g., Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568, 572 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Morse v. Gerity,
520 F. Supp. 470 (D. Conn. 1981); Mewbom v. Heckler, 101 F.R.D. 691, 693 (D.D.C. 1984). The
most widely accepted application today of the audit privilege is in cases concerning hospital self-
evaluations and medical personnel peer reviews. See David Sorenson, Comment, The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's Recent Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Conflict
with State-Created Environmental Audit Privilege Laws, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 483, 491 (Summer
1993) (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1994)).
22 See, e.g., Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1992).
21 See, e.g., Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507,508 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
24 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387 (D. Md. 1994) (noting
that courts are reluctant to recognize the audit privilege); Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145,
148 (E.D. Va. 1993) (stating that the Fourth Circuit does not recognize the audit privilege); Wright
v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
74 F.R.D. 518, 521 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); In re Application of the New York Times Co., No. M8-85,
1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1984); In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc., No. 89-
6308-CIV, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18793, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 1990); T.W.A.R., Inc. v. Pacific
Bell, 145 F.R.D. 105, 108 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding that the Ninth Circuit has not recognized
an audit privilege); Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., No. 87 Civ. 0150 (VLB), 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2956, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) (expressing doubt that "the self-critical analysis
privilege remains viable" after the Supreme Court's decision in University of Pennsylvania v.
E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)).
' A number of courts have found that the privilege does not protect affirmative action
plans which are required to be created under Title VII and federal regulations. See, e.g., Witten v.
A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446, 452-54 (D. Md. 1984), affd, 785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the affirmative action plan was required pursuant to federal law, thus, it would not be
chilling to submit the plan to discovery and that, in any event, there are other disincentives to their
creation, including fear of reprisal for critiquing employer's compliance with federal employment
law); Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 178, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Martin v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (D.D.C. 1990); Arambuni v. Boeing Co., 885
F. Supp. 1434. 1441 (D. Kan. 1995); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 701 (C.D. Cal. 1995);
Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 148 (E.D. Va. 1993); Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp.
Auth., Civ. A. No. 84-3004, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12311, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1988); see also
41 C.F.R. § 1-12.811.
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available given the particular facts in the case. 6 Because the decision to
apply the privilege is made on a case-by-case basis and because the
courts are so reluctant to grant the privilege, the result is that a consistent
doctrine for application of the privilege across all categories of cases has
not emerged.
B. Factors Generally Considered in Deciding Whether the Privilege
Applies
In general, however, courts tend to consider four factors in
deciding whether the materials in question will be privileged: (1)
Whether the material sought to be discovered was the product of an
internal self-examination by the corporation; (2) whether the corporation
intended to and did keep the material confidential; (3) whether there is
a strong public interest in encouraging such audits to be performed; and
(4) whether there is a strong possibility that denial of the privilege will
chill the performance of such audits in the future.27 Each of these will
be described in greater detail.
The first consideration is whether the material was the product
of an internal audit conducted by the corporation. This question is more
complicated than it appears because not everything that the corporation
may consider to be an "audit" will necessarily satisfy this criteria.2"
Furthermore, some courts have found that purely investigatory inquiries
and audits conducted in the normal course of business do not qualify for
the privilege.29 This factor alone excludes many audits that corporations
would conduct as part of an established environmental compliance
program or occupational safety and health program to determine levels
of compliance and make recommendations for improved performance.
6 See, e.g., Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
17 See Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Environmental Audit
Reports, 25 ENvnL. L. 73, 80-82 (Winter 1995); Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., Legal Development: The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: A Survey of the Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 187 (1996).
' The first consideration is whether the material in question meets the court's definition
of "audit." There are numerous definitions of "audit" or "critical self-evaluation" that a court may
consider in determining whether the material in question qualifies for the privilege. See Gish, supra
note 27, at 81 n.40. In addition to the various definitions provided by commentators and the courts,
the EPA has put forth its own definition: "[An environmental audit is] a systematic, documented,
periodic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to
meeting environmental requirements." EPA, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,710 (Dec. 22, 1995).
29 See, e.g., Davidson v. Light, 79 F.R.D. 137, 139-40 (D. Colo. 1978) (finding that
examination was investigatory); Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding that minutes of safety committee meeting are not privileged because the meeting
was conducted in the normal course of business).
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Another limitation arising under this first factor is that only
opinions and subjective impressions will be protected by the privilege,
not facts.3" Therefore, portions of an audit report and notes of members
of the audit team that only contain facts may be discoverable, while the
portions containing the teams' analysis and opinions formed based on
those facts may be privileged. A court may order that a redacted version
of such materials be provided to the requesting party.
The second factor, confidentiality, is as critical for the common
law audit privilege as it is for other common law privileges, such as the
attorney/client privilege. Courts will not protect an audit report from
disclosure if the corporation has not limited distribution of the report.3'
The privilege will be considered to have been waived if the report is
widely available to persons within or without the corporation, without
effort to maintain a "need-to-know" limitation on distribution. Likewise,
the privilege will be waived if previously confidential information in the
report is otherwise revealed in discovery, such as in a deposition. 2
The third and fourth factors are based upon the underlying
policy supporting the audit privilege, namely that there must be a strong
public interest in encouraging the type of audit at issue to be conducted
and that there is a strong possibility that requiring disclosure would
discourage future audits. Stated another way, in order for the privilege
to apply, the purpose of the audit must be to examine a subject
concerning which the public has a strong interest and there must be an
overwhelming likelihood that such an audit would be chilled by
disclosure.
Courts have found a strong public interest in audits being
conducted in subjects such as health care,33 employment discrimination, a4
and public safety." Environmental pollution also appears to fit this
" See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 792 F. Supp. 197, 205 (E.D.N.Y.
1992); Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 619 (S.D. Cal. 1996); Sheppard v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 893 F. Supp. 6,7 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Webb. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
81 F.R.D. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 511 F. Supp. 1286,
1296-97 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, No. 83-3716 (WCC), 1984
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18166, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1984); OConnor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D.
211,217-18 (D. Mass. 1980); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
"' See, e.g., Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360, 363 (W.D. Mich.
1986); Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
32 See, e.g., Peterson, 112 F.R.D. at 363 (noting that the information was revealed by a
deposition witness).
a See, e.g., Gilman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See, e.g., Stevenson v. General Elec. Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 8777 (S.D.
Ohio 1978).
31 See, e.g., Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
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criteria." Occupational safety and health should fall into that category
also. Such a conclusion is not a given for every category of materials,
however. There are cases in which courts have found that the subject
matter of the audit at issue did not further a strong public interest.37
On the other hand, there are many cases where the subject was
certainly one in which there was a strong public interest, but the courts
denied the privilege because disclosure was not likely to have a chilling
effect on conducting such audits in the future. The courts concluded that
the party conducting the audit had such a compelling reason to conduct
the audit, such as a regulatory requirement to conduct an audit or the
need to investigate the cause of an accident, that no privilege was needed
to encourage auditing and mandating disclosure would not overcome the
reason to conduct the audit.38 In the environmental law context, some
courts have found that disclosure of audit material would not have a
chilling effect because corporations have such a strong incentive to
monitor their own compliance to avoid suffering civil or criminal
penalties.39
One court has noted that there is a strong public interest in corporations' identifying
sources of pollution. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla.
1994) ("As applied to the facts of this ease, it is self-evident that pollution poses a serious public
health risk, and that there is a strong public interest in promoting the voluntary identification and
remediation of industrial pollution.").
3' See, e.g., In re Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 91 Civ. 5442 (RPP), No. 91 Civ. 5471,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17280, at 12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (finding that there is not an
"overwhelming public interest" in encouraging self-evaluation of businesses).
" See, e.g., Warren v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 540, 542-43
(E.D.N.C. 1995) (refusing to apply an audit privilege, in part, because the National Association of
Securities Dealers required the audit to be conducted); Ott v. St. Luke Hosp. of Campbell County,
Inc., 522 F Supp. 706, 709-10 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (denying privilege for hospital peer review materials
where committee's functions would not be hampered by discovery); Skibo v. City of N.Y., 109
F.R.D. 58, 63-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1985): In re Salomon, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17280, at *11-12
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (finding that "[l]he economic efficiencies, the accuracy of financial
reporting and the improvement of business standards achieved by internal auditing programs and
management control studies are so integral to the success of a business that the free flow of
information is not likely to be stemmed by the possibility of future disclosure"); Myers v. Uniroyal
Chem. Co., No. 91-6716, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6472, at "13 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1992) (concluding
that investigation of industrial accidents will not be chilled by disclosure of investigation report);
Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 182 (S.D. Iowa 1993) ("[The court's [sic] doubts that
permitting plaintiffs in employment discrimination actions from discovering such reports as
affirmative action plans or other equal employment compliance documents will have a'chilling' affect
[sic] upon employers' self-evaluations or discourage employers from frank reflection in those reports
required by the federal government.").
" See Koppers Company, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Surety Co., 847 F. Supp. 360, 364
(W.D. Pa. 1994), rev'd 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[We disagree that a corporation would face
a Hobson's choice between due diligence and self-incrimination in the tightly-regulated
environmental context, for that context requires strict attention to environmental affairs. We doubt
that today potential polluters will violate regulations requiring environmental diligence for fear of
these documents being used against them tomorrow."); Louisiana Environmental Action Network,
Inc. v. Evans Indus., Inc., No. 95-3002 section "K", 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8117, at 7 (E.D. La.
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C. Other Limitations on Application of the Privilege
In addition to the four factors described above, there are other
limitations on application of the privilege. First, it is a qualified
privilege. Even if the above factors are met, the privilege may still not
apply if the party seeking discovery can show that it has a compelling
need for the materials or that there are other extraordinary circumstances
supporting discovery in the case.'
Second, the privilege may be inadvertently or voluntarily
waived. If the party seeking to assert the privilege also attempts to use
the materials at trial, the privilege is waived.4 Furthermore, a party
asserting the privilege on appeal must have raised the privilege in the
case below or it may be deemed to have been waived.42
Third, in some cases courts have held that the privilege only
applies to protect disclosure to non-governmental parties of reports that
a government agency requires the corporation to create and retain.43 This
limitation is based on the rationale that it would be unfair for the
government to require an audit report to be created, then make the report
available to private parties to be used against the corporation, while there
is no such unfairness where the corporation has voluntarily undertaken
June 10, 1996) ("As correctly noted by the plaintiff, 'the consequences of failure to comply with state
and federal environmental laws and regulations -- including the possibility of criminal sentences,
substantial civil penalties, debarment from entering into government contracts and public disapproval
-- make it essential that corporations constantly evaluate their compliance with those laws and
regulations.'). But see Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla.
1994) (applying the self-evaluative privilege to retroactive evaluations).
o See Reichhold Chemicals, 157 F.R.D. at 527; Todd v. South Jersey Hosp. Sys., 152
F.R.D. 676, 683 (D.N.J. 1993); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., New York, 692 F.2d 901,908 (2d
Cir. 1982) (concluding that academic peer review materials will not be privileged where plaintiff has
a compelling need for the materials sought); Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664
F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that no privilege will apply to shield medical peer
review materials in an antitrust action because of plaintiffs compelling need for the information and
the strong public interest in antitrust enforcement).
One court has opined that the public interest in learning of environmental pollution
outweighs the public interest in such information being kept confidential to avoid chilling auditing
activity. Koppers, 847 F. Supp. at 364-65. Another court applied a similar analysis in concluding that
the public benefits from private enforcement of equal employment laws through private actions
against employers. Tharp v. Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177, 183-84 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
"l See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 552 (7th Cir. 1985).
42 See First E. Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465,467 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
41 See, e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("To be
privileged, the materials must have been prepared for mandatory government reports."); Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Service Corp. Int'l, 12 U.S. P. Q.2d (BNA) 1128 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1989);
Webb, 81 F.R.D. at 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 374-5
(N.D. Il. 1982).
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the audit.44
A fourth and very significant limitation for environmental and
OSH audits is that the privilege does not apply when the government is
the party seeking discovery. 45 The rationale for this limitation goes back
to the basis of the privilege which is to further a strong public interest,
rather than to protect a private right. Courts rely on the notion that
Congress has already decided that the public interest lies in supporting
agency authority to enforce certain federal laws; therefore, the courts will
not hinder federal agency efforts to obtain materials relevant to agency
investigatory and enforcement activities. 46 This latter limitation is one
of the reasons why there has been such interest on the part of the private
sector in having state and federal legislatures create audit privileges in
statutes rather than relying on the common law.
IV. OTHER PROTECTIONS THAT MAY APPLY: THE ATrORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Attorney/Client Privilege
In addition to the common law audit privilege, companies
occasionally also invoke the attorney/client privilege and the work
product doctrine to protect audit reports from discovery or use in
evidence. In general, these have proven to be even less satisfactory than
the common law audit privilege in protecting audits. This is largely due
to a mismatch between the purposes behind the attorney/client privilege
and work product doctrine and the reason for conducting most internal
audits.
The purpose behind the attorney/client privilege is to encourage
honest and open communication and consultation between client and
attorney.47 The purpose behind the work product doctrine is to allow
attorneys to produce analytical work in anticipation of litigation without
fear of the opposition's discovery of the attorney's thoughts and
" Resnick, 95 F.R.D. at 375; Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
45 See, e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1989); FTC v. TRW, Inc.,
628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Noall, 587 F. 2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding
that internal audit of tax practices is not privileged against discovery by the Internal Revenue
Service); United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8, 9-10 (D. Conn. 1990) (denying privilege
where EPA requested environmental audit report); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386,
388 (D. Md. 1994); Reich v. Hercules, 857 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D.N.J. 1994); Hardy v. New York
News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);.
4 See Reich, 857 F. Supp. at 371; Dexter, 132 F.R.D. at 9.
41 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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impressions.4" The reason for conducting internal audits is not
necessarily to receive legal advice or to prepare for litigation. Often,
attorneys are not directly involved in the audit process at all. If they are,
it may be solely to provide advice on interpreting regulatory
requirements in light of a specific audit finding. Such advice would not
necessarily be considered part of the audit process itself.
In spite of these limitations, there are situations in which the
attorney/client privilege and the work product doctrine could apply.
Knowing these in advance should influence decisions a company must
make in how it will conduct its audit, in order to preserve the ability to
rely on one of these protections should the need arise.
The following conditions must be met for the attorney/client
privilege to apply:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to
become a client; (2) the person to whom the
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of
a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attomey
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the
privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by
the client.49
To summarize these elements, the question for determining whether the
attorney/client privilege applies to an audit is whether there was a
confidential communication between an attorney and client which was
made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
This is an absolute privilege that cannot be overcome by a
showing of need by the party requesting the privileged information.5"
The privilege, however, only protects the attorney/client communication
itself. Underlying facts are not protected by virtue of their having been
" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
49 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). For a thorough review of the attorney-client privilege, see PAUL R. RICE ET AL., ArroRNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
" See Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1493-95 (9th Cir.
1989).
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the subject of an attorney/client communication.' Therefore, facts or
materials do not become privileged simply by being conveyed to an
attorney, and only materials and communications containing legal advice
may be privileged.52
Given these basic rules, there are several reasons why the
attorney/client privilege often is found not to apply to audits." The first
reason is that the purpose of an audit is usually primarily to obtain non-
legal recommendations. If an attorney is involved in the audit process,
the attorney may be serving more as a business advisor than a legal
advisor.5 4 The purpose of the audit and the attorney's participation may
be more to improve cost efficiency in environmental or OSH programs
than to obtain legal advice. If this is so, then the privilege may not
apply."
Another reason why the attorney/client privilege may not apply
to an environmental or OSH audit is that the audit may not meet the
confidentiality requirements of the privilege. The distribution of the
audit report may not be appropriately limited to preserve the privilege.
Furthermore, the composition of the audit team itself may include
outside experts and others whose participation is not related to assisting
the attorney in providing legal assistance. Outside consultants are often
used to conduct or review an audit. An outside consultant's participation
will destroy the confidentiality of the communication unless the
consultant is an agent of the attorney or the client.56 To be an agent of
the attorney, the consultant should be hired by the attorney or at the
s' See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977).
52 See Diversified Indus., 572 F.2d at 602; Wonneman v. Stratford Secs. Co., 23 F.R.D.
281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
" See. e.g., McGuire v. Sigma Coatings, Inc., 48 F.3d 902, 903-04 (5th Cir. 1995);
Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 7811 (KC), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1993); United States v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 88-6681,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989); In re Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D.
82, 84-86 (E.D. Pa. 1992); See generally, Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., Legal Development: The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: A Survey of the Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 171, 192 (1996); Harris,
supra note 1, at 686-88; David Sorenson, Comment, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
Recent Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Conflict with State-Created Environmental
Audit Privilege Laws, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 483, 490-91 (Summer 1993). But see Olen Properties
Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc., No. CV 91-6446-WDK (MCX), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7125 (C.D. Cal.
April 12, 1994).
54 See United States v. Chevron, U.S.A., No. 88-6681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267,
at *16-18 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989); Eutectic Corp. v. Meteo Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 38-39 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
" See United States v. Chevron, U.S.A., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *16-18 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 16,1989).
56 See Resnick v. American Dental Ass'n, 95 F.R.D. 372, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Matter, 147 F.R.D. 82, 84-86 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
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attorney's direction. 7 The consultant also must work under the
supervision of the attorney. 58 To be an agent of the client, the consultant
must be communicating with the attorney on the client's behalf for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice for the client."
The attorney does not necessarily have to be a direct party to a
communication for the privilege to apply. If an agent of the attorney is
party toa communication with the client, the privilege may apply. An
employee of the client could act as an agent of the attorney, as could an
outside expert working under the direction of the attorney. 60 Therefore,
the attorney does not necessarily have to conduct the investigation, for
example, but the investigation has to be performed at least by an agent
of the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the
attorney.
For all these reasons, courts usually find that the attorney/client
privilege does not apply to protect audits under facts and circumstances
similar to those that arise concerning environmental and OSH audits. In
most cases where the attorney/client privilege is invoked the defendant
also invokes the work product doctrine.
B. Work Product Doctrine
Another possible protection for audit reports is the work product
doctrine. This rule protects documents prepared by an attorney in
anticipation of litigation.61 This is a qualified protection that may be
overcome upon a showing of "substantial need" and an inability to obtain
equivalent materials without incurring "undue hardship."62
Like the attorney/client privilege, the work product doctrine in
most circumstances will not apply to protect environmental or OSH
audits. One reason for this is that the audits are not often prepared "in
anticipation of litigation." It may be argued, of course, that they are
being prepared with the idea of avoiding litigation in the future, but
courts have held that the litigation contemplated must be more than a
remote possibility.63 The litigation does not actually have to have begun,
" United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420,426 (N.D. Ill. 1972). modified 478 F.2d
1038.
' Baxter Travenol Labs, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, No. 84 C 5103, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10300, at *34 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1987).
59 In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1991).
6 In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 545, 547 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
6' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) Advisory Committee's notes.
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
63 See Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (1974).
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however. Most audits occur in what would be called the "ordinary
course of business." This would not qualify for work product doctrine
protection. 6'
Another reason the doctrine may not apply is that it is meant to
protect the mental impressions and conclusions of attorneys from
disclosure. Much of what a company may want to protect in an audit
report may not consist of attorney opinion.' Facts are not protected, nor
are the opinions of non-attorney participants in the audit team.66
The right to assert this doctrine also may be voluntarily or
involuntarily waived by the client.67 One example of waiver might be
voluntary disclosure of audit documents to the government.68
Thus, as with the attorney/client privilege, the criteria that must
be met for the work product doctrine to apply are often absent in audit
cases. Furthermore, in certain respects the work product doctrine would
not go far enough to provide the scope of protection a company may
want for its audit information.
V. LEGISLATING ENVIRONMENTAL AND OSH AUDIT PROTECTION AND
IMMUNITIES
A. State Legislation
In response to the reluctance of the courts to apply the audit
privilege to environmental and safety and health audits, there have been
efforts at the federal and state levels to create statutory audit privileges.69
This section will describe those efforts.
State privilege law, whether common law or statutory law,
applies in actions in federal courts only when "state law provides the rule
Portions of audits performed after an accident, as part of an investigation into
causation, may be considered attorney work product since they would arguably be performed in
anticipation of litigation concerning the accident. See Smith v. United States, No. 87-883-FR, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4547, at *6-7 (May 9. 1988).
0 But see Waste Management Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.. 571 So.2d 507, 510
(Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1990) (protecting photographs that attorney directed be taken).
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
67 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).
But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414,
1427-31 (3d Cir. 1991).
' A large number of states have enacted laws protecting hospital self-evaluations and
medical peer review evaluations. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-143 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 624-25.5 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West 1993-
1994).
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of decision," as in federal diversity suits.7 ° Where, however, an action
in federal court contains only federal claims or both federal and state
claims, federal privilege law will govern.7 Therefore, in citizen suits
under federal environmental laws, federal privilege law will govern,72
whereas in toxic tort actions brought in federal courts under diversity
jurisdiction state privilege law will govern, as it would for suits brought
in state courts.
A number of states have enacted laws providing an
environmental audit privilege to companies under certain conditions.73
In general, there are two approaches that these states have taken to
provide incentives for companies to audit. 4 One approach is to shield
audit reports from discovery and use in any stage of an administrative,
civil or criminal action." This approach most resembles a true
evidentiary privilege, except that in order to receive the statutory
protection the company must take reasonably diligent action to report
and abate the violation. Oregon's law, which was the first state
70 FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Pkfinans Int'l Corp. v. IBJ Schroder Leasing Corp., No.
93 Civ. 5375 (SAS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17375, at *6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996).
Von Bulow by Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987).
72 Citizen suits are civil actions brought by private citizens to enforce certain
environmental laws. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1996); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1996); Safe Water Drinking Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1996); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1996); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,
33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1996); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1996).
" As of 1997, twenty-three states had enacted legislation providing some form of audit
privilege or immunity for companies that conducted environmental audits. They are Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. 1997 Alaska. Sess. Laws 29; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301
to -312 (Michie 1996); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-126.5, 13-90-107(j)(I)(A) (West 1995);
IDAHO CODE § 9-340 (1996); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 415, para. 5/52.2 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-
28-4-1 to -5, 4-20.5-7-5, 13-11-2-68 to 69 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3332 (1996); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-040 (Michie 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.14801-. 14810 (West
1996); 1995 Minn. Laws 168; MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (1997); 1997 Mont. Laws 534; 1997 Nev.
Stat. 297; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:1 (Michie 1996), repealed by 1996. 4:4, effective July 1,
2002; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3745.70-.72 (Anderson 1997): OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1996),
as amended by House Bill 357 1.enacted June 16, 1997,1997 R.I. Publ Laws 196; S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-57-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 1-40-33 to -36 (1997); 1995
Tex. Gen. Laws 219; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-103 to 19-7-107 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
1198 (1997); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-11-1105 to 35-11-1106 (1997).
' See Mia Anna Mazza, Comment, The New Evidentiary Privilege for Environmental
Audit Reports: Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 82 n.12 (1996);
Sorenson, supra note 53, at 493.
" See supra, note 74. An example of such a law is Oregon's audit privilege statute which
provides that "an Environmental Audit Report shall be privileged and shall not be admissible as
evidence in any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding." OR. REV. STAT. §
468.963 (1996), as amended by House Bill 3571, enacted June 16, 1997.
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environmental audit law, takes this approach.76
The second approach is to provide some level of immunity for
violations found by an audit and promptly reported to the appropriate
government agency.77 Colorado's law does this.7"
Some of the statutes also go beyond the common law in other
ways. For example, the laws protect not only analysis and opinions, but
also facts.79 Certain state statutes also contain a testimonial privilege as
well as protection for written materials.8"
The federal EPA has adamantly opposed these state statutes on
the grounds that they interfere with enforcement of environmental laws,
deprive the public of information, lead to increased litigation over
interpretation of the law, and are unnecessary to encourage companies
to conduct audits."1 The EPA has even threatened to revoke states'
authorization to enforce federal environmental laws if those states pass
audit privilege statutes.8 2
B. Federal Legislation
1. Environmental Audit Bills
While many states have passed environmental audit privilege or
immunity statutes, Congress has not yet done so. One bill introduced in
1994 and two bills introduced in 1995 would have provided an
evidentiary audit privilege to shield environmental audit information
from discovery and use in any civil, criminal or administrative
proceeding, as long as certain conditions were met.83
S. 2371, S. 582, and H.R. 1047 were similar to the Oregon audit
privilege statute in that they provided a broad privilege for audit
76 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1996), as amended by House Bill 3571, enacted June 16,
1997.
See supra note 74.
78 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-126.5, 13-90-1070)(I)(A) (West 1995).
79 OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1996), as amended by House Bill 3571, enacted June 16,
1997, see also Mazza, supra note 74, at 104.
10 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(1)(j)(I)(A).
s EPA. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66705. 66710 (1995).
82 See Colorado and Ohio Accused of Skirting Federal Environmental Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at B7.
83 Environmental Audit Protection Act, S. 2371, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); Voluntary
Environmental Self-Evaluation Act, H.R. 1047, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Voluntary
Environmental Audit Protection Act, S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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reports." Under the provisions in these three bills, these protections
would be available only for audits that were voluntarily conducted and
only if the company took prompt action to come into compliance. 5 S.
S. 582 provided that:
an environmental audit report prepared in good faith by a person
or government entity related to, and essentially constituting a part
of, an environmental audit shall not be subject to discovery and
shall not be admitted into evidence in any civil or criminal action
or administrative proceeding before a Federal court or agency or
under Federal law.
S. 582, § 3801(a)(1). S. 2371 contained a very similar provision. S. 2371, § 4. S. 582 contained the
following definition of "Environmental Audit Report:"
The term 'environmental audit report' means any reports,
findings, opinions, field notes, records of observations,
suggestions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, drawings, computer
generated or electronically recorded information, maps, charts,
graphs, surveys, or other communications associated with an
environmental audit.
S. 582, § 3804(3). H.R. 1047 provided basically the same protection, with the following language:
... a report, finding, opinion, or other communication of a person
or entity related to, and essentially constituting a part of, a
voluntary environmental self-evaluation that is made in good faith
shall not be admissible evidence in any legal action or
administrative procedure under Federal law and shall not be
subject to any discovery procedure under Federal law....
H.R. 1047, § 4(a). H.R. 1047 defined "Voluntary Environmental Self-Evaluation" as:
... an assessment, audit, investigation or review that is --
(A) initiated by a person or entity;
(B) carried out by the person or entity, or a consultant employed
by the person or entity, for the express purpose of carrying out
the assessment, audit or review; and
(C) carried out to determine whether the person or entity is in
compliance with Federal environmental laws (including any
permit issued under a Federal environmental law).
H.R. 1047, § 3(6).
' S. 2371, § 4. S. 582 provided that, among other limitations, the protections would not
apply if the information were required to be reported to a regulatory agency under federal law (thus,
the audit must be voluntary) or if:
(i) the environmental audit report provides evidence of
noncompliance with a covered Federal law; and
(ii) appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were not promptly
initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence; ...
S. 582, § 3801(2)-(3). H.R. 1047 contained similar limitations, in that the audit had to be "voluntary"
and the protections would not apply unless:
(i) the report, finding, opinion, or other communication indicates
noncompliance with a Federal environmental law; and
(ii) the person or entity failed to initiate efforts to achieve
compliance with the law within a period of time that is reasonable
and that is adequate to achieve compliance (including submitting
an appropriate permit application);...
H.R. 1047, § 4(a)(2)(A), (b). In addition, that bill also contained an exception to the protection for
situations in which:
(B) compelling circumstances --
(i) make it necessary to admit the environmental audit report,
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582 and H.R. 1047 also contained testimonial privileges concerning
audit information.16 Furthermore, since the protections were to apply to
an "audit report," the protections would have extended to facts as well as
opinions in the report.87
In addition to the protection from discovery and admission into
evidence, H.R. 1047 and S. 582 also would have provided immunity
from administrative, civil or criminal penalties for violations that were
"voluntarily disclosed" to the EPA, much like the Colorado statute. 88
Thus, the bills took both the privilege and the immunity approaches
finding, opinion, or other communication into evidence; or
(ii) necessitate that the environmental audit report, finding,
opinion, or other communication be subject to discovery
procedures;...
H.R. 1047, § 4.
S. 582, § 3802; H.R. 1047, § 5.
" See the definition of "Environmental Audit Report", supra note 85.
" Section 6 of H.R. 1047 provided:
(a) IN GENERAL - The disclosure of information relating to a Federal
environmental law to the appropriate official of a Federal or State agency
responsible for administering a Federal environmental law shall be
considered to be a voluntary disclosure if--
(1) the disclosure of information arises out of a voluntary environmental self-
evaluation;
(2) the person or entity that initiates the self-evaluation --
(A) ensures that the disclosure is made promptly after receiving knowledge
of the information referred to in paragraph (1); and
(B) initiates an action to address the issues identified in the disclosure --
(i) within a reasonable period of time after receiving knowledge of the
information; and
(ii) within a period of time that is adequate to achieve compliance with the
requirements of the Federal environmental law that is the subject of the
action (including submitting an application for an applicable permit): and
(3) the person or entity that makes the disclosure provides any further
relevant information requested, as a result of the disclosure, by the
appropriate official of the Federal or State agency responsible for
administering the Federal environmental law.
(c) PRESUMPTION OF APPLICABILITY ...
(2) until such time as the presumption [of applicability] is rebutted, the
person or entity shall be immune from any administrative, civil, or criminal
penalty for the violation.
H.R. 1047, § 6. See also S. 582, § 3803.
This provision would not apply:
if the person or government entity making the disclosure has been
found by a Federal or State court to have committed a pattern of
significant violations of Federal or State laws, or orders on
consent, related to environmental quality, due to separate and
distinct events giving rise to the violations, during the 3-year
period prior to the date of disclosure.
H.R. 1047. § 6(b). See also S. 582, § 3803(b).
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reflected in certain state statutes. 89
These bills would have provided more protection for
environmental audits than would the common law privilege, even if it
were to apply.9 To receive the statutory privilege and immunity offered
in the bills, however, companies were required to satisfy the reporting
and compliance action prerequisites. In this respect, the bills would have
done more to foster cooperation and compliance by companies that
voluntarily audit and wish to receive the protections offered by the
statutes than would the one-way benefit that the common law privilege
provides. Moreover, the bills would have complemented existing state
environmental audit legislation, as the federal bills would have applied
to federal actions and to the federal EPA.
For the same reasons it has opposed the state legislation, the
Clinton Administration opposed these bills.9 An EPA official testified
before Congress against S. 582, objecting to the bill on the grounds that
"it would cripple environmental law enforcement and the public's right
to know."92 The EPA also objected on the grounds that the privilege
provision was "vague" and too "broad," and would require EPA to
litigate questions over whether the evidentiary privilege applied.93
To date, at least one environmental audit bill has been
introduced in the 105th Congress that would provide privileges for
environmental audits. S. 866, the Environmental Protection Partnership
Act, was introduced on June 10, 1997. 4 That bill contains privilege and
immunity provisions based on S. 582 and H.R. 1047, but it attempts to
solve some of the deficiencies discussed in the hearings on those bills. 95
" See Hearings on S. 582 before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1996) (statement of S. Hatfield).
o The common law privilege would not protect facts and would not preclude discovery
by the government.
" See Hearings on S. 582 before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.12 (1996) (statements of Steven A.
Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA and
Lois Schiffer Assistant Attorney General, Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S.
Department of Justice and Veronica Coleman, U.S. attorney, Western District of Tennessee).
9 id. at 12.
93 id.
S' . 866, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
9s The general privilege section of S. 866 provides, in part, as follows:
See. 3601 Admissibility of environmental audit reports
(a) GENERAL RULE
(1) IN GENERAL - Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3),
an environmental audit report that is prepared in good faith, or a
finding, opinion, or other communication that is made in good
faith by a person or government entity and that is related to, and
essentially constitutes a part of, an environmental audit report,
shall not be --
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Certain procedural additions to the bill include detailed procedures for
in camera review for privilege determinations, procedures allowing
seizure of the audit information pending an in camera privilege review
if there is independent information establishing probable cause to believe
that a federal crime has been committed and that the audit report may
contain discoverable information concerning the crime, and procedures
for resolving immunity disputes.96
One significant addition to the bill is a limitation on the
immunity afforded by the bill, such that immunity from civil and
criminal sanctions would be precluded if the violation was intentional or
willful or was a "knowing endangerment offense" under certain statutes,
or if certain other specific circumstances exist.97  Another
(A) subject to discovery or any other
investigatory procedure; or
(B) admissible as evidence in any judicial
action or administrative proceeding.
(2) EXCLUDED ITEMS - Paragraph (1) shall not
apply to --
(A) a document, communication, data,
report, or other item of information that is required to be
collected, developed, maintained, or reported to a regulatory
agency under a covered Federal law ....
(3) INAPPLICABILITY - Paragraph (1) shall not
apply to an environmental audit report if... a judge determines
that --
(A) the person or government entity that
initiated the environmental audit expressly waives, pursuant to
subsection (b), the protection provided by paragraph (1);
(B) the environmental audit provides
evidence of noncompliance with a covered Federal law and
appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were not promptly
initiated and pursued with reasonable diligence;
(C) the person or government entity that
is asserting the applicability of paragraph (1) is doing so for a
fraudulent purpose; or
(D) the environmental audit report,
finding, opinion, or other communication was prepared for the
purpose of avoiding disclosure of information required for a
governmental investigative, administrative, orjudicial proceeding
that, at the time of preparation, was imminent or in progress.
S. 866, § 3601(a).
"9 S. 866, §§ 3601(c), 3603(0.
97 The immunity section of the bill contains the following language:
See. 3603 Disclosures
(a) In GENERAL - If a person or government entity discloses
information relating to a covered Federal law to an appropriate
official of a Federal or State agency responsible for administering
the covered Federal law, the disclosure shall be considered to be
a voluntary disclosure subject to protection under subsection (b),
regardless of whether the disclosure is required by law, if --
(1) the disclosure arises out of a voluntary
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environmental compliance management system by the person or
government entity;
(2) the disclosure is made promptly after the person
or government entity receives knowledge of the information;
(3) the person or government entity initiates an action
to address the issues identified in the disclosure --
(A) within a reasonable period of time
after receiving knowledge of the information; and
(B) within a period of time that is adequate
to achieve compliance with the requirements of the covered
Federal law that is the subject of the action; and
(4) the person or government entity reasonably
provides any further relevant information requested, as a result of
the disclosure, by the appropriate official of the Federal or State
agency responsible for administering the covered Federal law, not
including information protected by this chapter, the attorney-
client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, or any other
applicable privilege.
(b) LIMITED IMMUNITY -
(1) IN GENERAL - Subject to paragraph (2), if a
person or government entity makes a voluntary disclosure under
subsection (a) --
(A) the person or government entity shall
be immune from any enforcement action brought as a result of
the disclosure; and
(B) the disclosed information shall not, in
any court or administrative proceeding, be subject to discovery or
be admissible against the person or government entity that made
the disclosure.
(2) PERMISSIBLE SANCTIONS AND
ADMISSIONS INTO EVIDENCE - Paragraph (1) does not
preclude --
(A) imposition of a civil sanction in an administrative
or civil action to the extent that a violation was committed
intentionally and willfully;
(B) imposition of a criminal sanction --
(i) against a natural person, if --
(1) the person committed, or
aided or abetted the commission of, a disclosed violation
intentionally or willfully; or
(I) the disclosed violation is a
knowing endangerment offense described in section 309(c)(3) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1319(C)(3)),
section 3008(e) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C.
6928(e)), or section 113(c)(5) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
7413(c)(5)); or
(ii) against an entity other than a natural
person, if --
(I) the disclosed violation was
committed intentionally and willfully by a member of the entity's
senior management;
(II) the disclosed violation is
knowing endangerment offense described in section 309(c)(3) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1319(c)(3)),
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major addition is a section allowing states to enact certain types of audit
privilege and immunity laws to apply to state and local proceedings and
prohibiting federal agencies (EPA) from refusing to authorize state
programs because a state has an audit privilege law.98
Although S. 866 contains provisions to address some of the
criticisms directed at S. 582 and H.R. 1047 -- that the privilege would
hamper enforcement and let the worst violators go free -- the controversy
over environmental audit privileges and immunities laws is not likely to
decrease since the dispute is as much about the policy behind them as it
is about the specific measures in the bills. That controversy will most
likely continue for some time.
2. OSHA Reform Bills
There also has been federal legislative activity to create an audit
privilege for OSH audits. As of mid-1997, senators introduced three
separate bills that contained privilege and immunity measures to
encourage auditing.
The Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act of 1997, S.
461, contains a privilege provision for OSH audits that would protect
against the employer or his agent being required to disclose audit
information "in any inspection, investigation, or enforcement proceeding
conducted pursuant to this Act."99 This provision, therefore, would not
extend the privilege as far as the environmental audit bills. Significantly,
S. 451 would not provide for the privilege to apply to other types of
section 3008(e) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C.
6928(e)), or section 113(c)(5) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.
7413(c)(5)); or
(I1) the entity's policies or lack
of preventive actions or systems contributed materially to the
occurrence of the violation; or
(C) admission of information into
evidence for the purpose of seeking injunctive relief against the
person or government entity to remedy a continuing adverse
public health or environmental effect of a violation.
S. 866, § 3603.
S. 866, § 3604.
9 The subsection in the bill reads as follows:
(i) Any records or other information created by or for an
employer for the purpose of conducting safety and health
inspections, audits, or reviews not required by this Act shall not
be required to be disclosed by the employer or the agent of the
employer in any inspection, investigation, or enforcement
proceeding conducted pursuant to this Act.
S. 461, § 5(i).
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actions, such as tort actions, which are not enforcement actions.
The bill would establish a "voluntary compliance" program
whereby an employer would be exempt from OSHA inspections and
investigations if the employer provides evidence to the Secretary of
Labor that the place of employment has been inspected under one of the
several consultation programs described in the bill or under its own
safety and health program, which includes certain features."° The
qualifying consultation services include state consultation programs or
certified private programs. The employer's own safety and health
program must include audit procedures and procedures for timely
correcting hazards, as well employee participation activities. Thus, the
bill uses an exemption from inspection and investigation to further
encourage auditing activity.
Finally, S. 461 would provide for limited immunity for
employers with a safety and health program.'0 ' Employers with a written
safety and health program would receive a 25 percent penalty reduction.
Those with both a written safety and health program and an exemplary
safety record will receive a 50 percent reduction.
The OSHA Modernization Act of 1997, S. 551, contains similar
provisions. Under this bill, an employer who meets certain preconditions
would be exempt from inspections and investigations. The preconditions
are very similar to those for the inspection exemption in S. 461: The
place of employment must have been inspected in the preceding year
under one of the consultation programs described in the bill or the
workplace has an exemplary safety and health record and the employer
has a safety and health program that includes auditing, among other
things.
0 2
The bill contains a different privilege provision than S. 461. The
privilege provided in S. 551 applies to audits conducted by employers
outside of a voluntary compliance program established by OSHA. This
privilege provides protection from disclosure to the Secretary of Labor
unless disclosure would be part of an investigation into a fatality or
serious injury or the employer has not taken steps to correct serious
hazards identified during the audit,"0 3 and is therefore a very limited
privilege. Like the limited privilege in S. 461, it only would protect from
disclosure in OSHA investigatory or enforcement actions, not in private
actions. Furthermore, the limitation precluding application of the
1- S. 461, § 8A.
101 S. 461, § 12(a)(3).
'0 S. 551, § 8A.
103 S. 551, § 8A(f).
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privilege in situations where the employer has not corrected hazards
identified in the audit begs the question of how OSHA would know that
the hazard had been identified in the audit in the first place, until OSHA
had discovery of the audit information. Further, this privilege appears
to be limited to documentation since the language used is "records".
Presumably there wo uld be no testimonial privilege under this provision.
S. 551 also contains a limited immunity that provides for penalty
reductions as S. 461 does. S. 551 goes a step further, however, by
providing for a seventy-five percent penalty reduction where the worksite
has been inspected under a consultation program and the employer has
complied with OSHA's recommendations that would bring the employer
into compliance."°
Finally, the bill provides for the establishment of a voluntary
protection program that would exempt qualified program participants
from inspections and certain paperwork requirements. To become
qualified for the program, employers would have to have in place a
safety and health program that presumably would include regular
auditing to identify workplace hazards.
The third OSHA Reform bill to be introduced in the Senate in
the first session of the 105th Congress is S. 765. Like the other bills
already described, S. 765, the Safety and Health Advancement Act,
contains measures to encourage active employer self-policing. The bill
contains a detailed description of a "third party consultation services
program" that includes certification of safety and health professionals to
conduct audits at employer workplaces. 5 These "consultants" would
perform inspections, much like OSHA would, to inform employers of
violative conditions and to give them an opportunity to correct those
conditions and then obtain a "declaration of compliance." An employer
who receives a declaration will be rewarded with a two-year exemption
from the assessment of any civil penalty. However, there would be no
exemption if the employer did not make a "good faith effort to remain in
compliance under the declaration" or if there were a "fundamental
change in the hazards of the workplace. 1°6 Thus, this bill goes further
than the other two in creating complete immunity from civil penalties, as
long as the employer meets the specified conditions. This would be a
strong incentive to participate in the consultation program.
The bill also would provide a broader privilege than the other
bills. The privilege would apply to "any records relating to consultation
SS. 55 1, § 86j)(2)(B).
o S. 765, § 8A.
S0 5. 765, § 8A(f).
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services... provided by an individual qualified under the program.""
Such records would not be admissible in any court or administrative
proceeding, except a disciplinary one against the consultant. This
privilege, then, would apply to claims outside the OSH Act. A
significant limitation on the privilege, however, is that it only applies to
consultation services provided by a third party as they are set out in the
bill. It would not apply to audits conducted by the employer independent
of the formal consultation services to be established by the bill. As it is
drafted, this provision has two other limitations. It does not apply to
testimony, and it is not a privilege against discovery. It only says that the
records are not "admissible."' '
The bill also would establish voluntary protection programs.09
Two programs are described, both of which would include auditing.
"Cooperative agreements" calls for agreements between OSHA and
employers to establish "comprehensive safety and health management
systems" that include, among other things, "requirements for systematic
assessment of hazards." Like S. 461 and S. 551, the bill describes a
"voluntary protection program" that would "encourage and recognize the
achievement of excellence in both the technical and managerial
protection of employees from occupational hazards." "0 This program
also would include auditing.
All three of these bills take very different approaches to granting
audit privileges and providing immunities for employers who audit than
the environmental audit bills do. As of this writing, the OSHA Reform
bills are still the subject of debate and negotiation and it is not yet clear
if any of these three bills, a combination of the three, or an entirely
different bill will be enacted."'
VI. EXECUTIVE BRANCH INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE AUDITING
A. EPA
Since 1986, EPA has had a series of formal policies intended to
encourage companies to audit their compliance with environmental laws
'" S. 765, § 8A(e).
108 Id.
'09 S. 765, § 14.
Ho S. 765, § 14(b).
S. 1237, 105"'Cong., 1 Sess. (1997); H.R. 2579, i05 Cong.. I' Sess. (1997); H.R.
2869, 105' h Cong., 1 Sess. (1997); See Dean Scott, Employer Groups Considering Strategy to
Protect Confidentiality of Self-Audits, DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA), Dec. 16, 1997, at A-7; Dean
Scott, Supporters Call Bill a New Approach; Panel Chairman Pledges Early Consideration,
OCcUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH (BNA), Oct. 1, 1997, at 579-80.
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and regulations."' The policy stated that "EPA will not routinely request
environmental audit reports .... EPA's authority to request an audit
report... will be exercised on a case-by-case basis where the Agency
determines it is needed to accomplish a statutory mission, or where the
Government deems it to be material to a criminal investigation.""3 In
terms of any immunity, the policy stated that "[iun fashioning
enforcement responses to violations, EPA policy is to take into account,
on a case-by-case basis, the honest and genuine efforts of regulated
entities to avoid and promptly correct violations and underlying
environmental problems."
'"14
The policy, therefore, was rather vague, both in terms of any
statement that EPA would not seek to discover audit information in
investigations or enforcement actions and in terns of any immunity from
penalties that companies could gain from voluntarily auditing their
compliance. Companies obtained no real assurance from this policy that
auditing would not create evidence that EPA would seek to use against
them, and no real promise of immunity as a reward for conducting
audits. 
115
In 1991, the U.S. Department of Justice also issued an audit
policy." 6 This is an internal guideline for prosecution decisions where
issues concerning environmental audits arise. The intent was to avoid
"undermin[ing] the goal of encouraging critical self-auditing, self-
policing, and voluntary disclosure.""l7 The policy specified factors for
prosecutors to consider in deciding whether and how to prosecute. These
factors include disclosure of the violation, cooperation with the
"2 The 1986 policy stated, "[i]t is EPA policy to encourage the use of environmental
auditing by regulated entities to help achieve and maintain compliance with environmental laws and
regulations, as well as to help identify and correct unregulated environmental hazards." EPA,
Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986).
111 Id at 25,007.
114 Id.
"s One commentator described companies' concerns in this way:
Corporations view [the 1986] policy as a Hobson's choice. On
one hand, auditing is a valuable tool to avoid noncompliance with
environmental laws. On the other hand, the information revealed
by an audit creates a risk of legal liability. If the audit reveals
violations of the law, not only must the firm report the violations
and subject itself to penalties, but regulators may potentially use
the audit itself to establish the requisite knowledge for a criminal
action against a corporation's executive officers.
Harris, supra note 1, at 683. See also Sorenson, supra note 53, at 486.
"I U.S. DmT. OF JUSTICE, FACTORS IN DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS IN THE CoNTExr OF SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE OR
DISCLOSURE EFFORTS BY THE VIOLATOR, July 1, 1991.
17 Id. at 1.
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government, whether the company has a compliance program, and
others. Companies also found this policy to be somewhat unsatisfactory
because it does not guarantee that the government will not use audits
against the companies."B
In 1994, the EPA issued a "restatement" of its audit policy in
response to the criticism of the 1986 policy." 9 This restatement
reiterated EPA's interest in encouraging auditing, and toward that end,
stated that "a violation that is voluntarily revealed and fully and promptly
remediated as part of a corporation's systematic and comprehensive self-
evaluation program generally will not be a candidate for the expenditure
of scarce criminal resources."'20
EPA completely revised its audit policy in 1995. The new
policy, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction,
and Prevention of Violations, is still in effect and contains several
significant provisions. 2' Unlike the earlier policy, the 1995 policy
contains specific privilege and immunity provisions. In the policy, EPA
commits to "not seek gravity-based penalties for violations found through
auditing that are promptly disclosed and corrected" as long as the
conditions set out in the policy are met. 122
EPA also commits in the policy not to "routinely request" audit
information. EPA states that it "will not request for use an
environmental audit report to initiate a civil or criminal investigation of
the entity.', 123 The policy includes the further statement that "[i]f the
Agency has an independent reason to believe that a violation has
occurred, however, EPA may seek any information relevant to
identifying violations or determining liability or extent of harm.' 24
Therefore, the policy does not include a blanket agreement not to seek
audit information in agency investigations or to use that information in
." Sorenson, supra note 53, at 486.
". EPA, Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg.
38,455 (1994).
"20 59 Fed. Reg. at 38,549.
121 EPA, Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706-66,712 (1995).
' Id. at 66,711. The conditions are that (1) "the violation was discovered through an
environmental audit or... systematic procedure... reflecting the regulated entities due diligence";
(2) "the violation was identified voluntarily"; (3) the company disclosed the violation within 10 days
of discovery; (4) the discovery and disclosure were made independent of any government action or
citizen suit or other third party revelation; (5) the company corrects the violation within a specified
period of time; (6) the company takes steps to prevent a recurrence; (7) the same violation has not
occurred in the previous three years; (8) the violation is not one of those excluded in the policy; and
(9) the company cooperates with the EPA in providing additional necessary information.
'2 Id. at 66,711.
124 Id.
[VOL. 12:211
1996-97] OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AUDITS 239
enforcement actions.
Finally, the policy states that EPA will not recommend criminal
action in cases where all of the conditions for obtaining a complete
gravity-based penalty immunity exist.1" There are two exceptions to this
statement. The agency may still seek criminal charges if there is a
"prevalent management philosophy" that allowed violations to exist or
there is willful involvement by a high-level corporate official in the
violation. EPA also "reserves the right" to recommend criminal charges
for any individual's criminal acts.
The 1995 Policy represents a major advance in EPA's approach
to encouraging auditing. However, it has met some criticism. First, it
does not, and cannot, limit private persons' rights to sue companies.
26
This is perhaps the greatest problem with using agency-level policy or
regulations to address the audit privilege question. By its very nature, a
policy created by EPA can only address what EPA will do, it cannot
direct the courts not to admit audits into evidence, as a federal statute can
do. It also cannot direct the Department of Justice, which has its own
policy and decisionmaking structure. Furthermore, the 1995 Policy is
only a policy document, it is not a regulation. EPA can change it at any
time and EPA can choose not to follow it at any time. The 1995 Policy
does contain some assurances and incentives for companies, but it can
only go so far.
B. OSHA
OSHA has taken a completely different approach than EPA to
encouraging auditing. Rather than establish a formal policy on auditing,
OSHA has put programs into place which encourage auditing and
employer participation or partnership with the agency in improving
occupational safety and health. OSHA is also preparing a regulation to
require auditing.
One of these programs is the Cooperative Compliance Program
(CCP). As of this writing, OSHA was just beginning to institute the
CCP nationwide after a long period of state experimentation with
CCPs. 127 Under the CCP, employers with the worst injury and illness
records would be given a choice of instituting safety and health programs
and in turn being subject to fewer and more focused inspections or
' id.; see supra note 121.
' Sorenson, supra note 53, at 507.
' NACOSH: OSHA 's Not Ready To Go Public With New CCP Program, INSIDE OSHA
(BNA), June 16, 1997, at 11-12.
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remaining on the general inspection list. The safety and health program
that employers would have to implement would include an auditing
component.1
28
Another of these programs is the Voluntary Protection Program
("VPP") that OSHA has established to reward the companies with the
best safety and health programs and injury and illness records.2 9 In
order to be a VPP participant, companies must successfully complete an
evaluation of their program and operation. The program includes
auditing; however, none of these programs includes a privilege.
Based upon its experience with these voluntary programs,
OSHA is now drafting a Comprehensive Safety and Health Program
regulation. As of this writing, the regulation is in the pre-proposal stages
of rulemaking. 3 ' Among the requirements in the draft regulation is one
calling for "hazard assessment" or auditing. 3' As it is currently drafted,
the regulation would require employers to conduct hazard assessments
or face penalties for not doing so. The regulation, however, would not
provide any privilege for audit information. Therefore, if this regulation
is promulgated as it is currently written, OSHA would be requiring
audits, rather than simply encouraging voluntary auditing as it has done
in the past. This is a very different approach than that which OSHA has
taken in the past and than that of the EPA. Undoubtedly, there will
much debate and discussion about this controversial regulation in the
months to come' 32
VII. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN OSH
AUDIT PRIVILEGE
A number of lessons can be taken from an analysis of the audit
privilege landscape. The first "lesson learned" is that the courts cannot
be relied upon to provide an audit privilege for OSH audits based solely
on common law principles. Courts can be expected to reach the same
12 Id.
129 See The United States Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (visited Jan. 7, 1997) <http://www.osha.govfoshprogslvpp>.
o OSHA's Working Draft of a Proposed Safety and Health Program Standard, Nov. 15,
1996, copy on file with the author.
- See id. at §§ (b)(2), (d).
.. OSHA has had a practice of collecting employers' audit information for use in
investigatory and enforcement actions. In fact, OSHA has resisted suggestions that it adopt a policy
that it not seek or use employer audit information. O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), 540 (Sept. 18, 1996). This
draft regulation should increase employer concern about audits being used against the companies
who create them, thereby discouraging candid and honest self-evaluations and undermining the intent
of the regulation that effective safety and health programs be implemented.
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conclusions about protection of OSH audits that they have already
reached in the few environmental audit cases they have decided. Even
if they were to extend a privilege to an OSH audit under the
circumstances of the particular case, presumably only analysis and
opinion would be privileged. Facts would be subject to disclosure.
Moreover, a single case or even a few cases decided in favor of a
company seeking to protect its audit information would not necessarily
signal a trend toward OSH audit protection in the federal courts since
such cases are heavily factually based and the courts have repeatedly
announced their reluctance to extend the privilege to a broad category of
cases. These pronouncements cannot give much assurance to companies
that the courts will protect their audit records.
The second lesson is similar to the first -- the courts cannot be
expected to extend the attorney/client privilege or the work product
doctrine to protect OSH audits. These doctrines have very specific
requirements that few audit cases could meet. In general, these doctrines
will not be the basis for protecting OSH audits.
The third lesson is that agency audit policies, and other programs
with a "carrot and stick" approach to encourage auditing, may be helpful
to companies and to the agency, but they cannot go far enough to give
the companies complete protection from having audits used against
them. Agency policies and programs can protect companies from the
various ways the particular agency can use audits against a company, but
agencies do not have the authority to limit third parties from obtaining
audit information in discovery or admitting it into evidence in a third
party suit against a company.
The fourth lesson is that state legislation, while helpful in certain
contexts, such as predicting state agency enforcement powers, suffers as
a solution to the overall problem for corporations because it does not
present a uniform and consistent approach to audit protection, and
because it cannot control enforcement at the federal level. This
complicates decisionmaking about audit policies for companies with
multi-state operations, and it adds to the competitive burdens on
companies in certain states with one form of audit legislation versus
companies in other states with a different form of audit legislation that
may be more financially beneficial to corporations.
The conclusion to be reached from this analysis is that federal
legislation for OSH audits, and for environmental audits, is necessary.
Federal legislation would create a more uniform OSH audit privilege
law, although there likely would be certain interpretive differences across
the various federal judicial jurisdictions.
The federal OSH audit legislation should contain the following
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measures. The federal statute should establish a minimum level of
protections which states must meet, although states may provide more
incentives to encourage audits. The law should provide a privilege
against use of audit reports, including facts and opinions they may
contain, in any administrative, civil or criminal action, whether state or
federal. The privilege should not apply where employers conducted the
audit in bad faith, such as to commit fraud or to conceal evidence of
noncompliance. The federal legislation should also include a testimonial
privilege.
The legislation also should provide either full immunity from
penalties or a penalty reduction in an amount that would create a strong
incentive for companies to audit. The final major provision should be to
require companies to report any OSH regulatory or statutory violations
and take reasonable steps to bring their operations into compliance
within a reasonably prompt period of time in order to receive the
privilege and immunity protections provided by the statute.
Such an enactment will increase companies' realistic
expectations and understandings of what penalty reduction benefits they
may gain by auditing their OSH practices and what they have to do to
obtain those benefits. It also would provide them with assurance that
they may determine with some certainty the remaining legal risks
associated with auditing. By thus encouraging increased self-policing,
OSHA will benefit from a reduced need for enforcement and inspection
activity and the workforce and the public will benefit from a reduction
in occupational injuries and illnesses due to companies' increased
proactive compliance efforts.
[VOL. 12:211
